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 Chapter 2 
 State Norms, Religious Norms, and Claims 
of Plural Normativity under Democratic 
Constitutions 
 Michele  Graziadei 
 Abstract  Contemporary democracies are open to cultural and religious diversity, 
but encounter problems when prevailing values and norms are questioned in the 
name of religious or cultural beliefs and practices. In many Western liberal democ-
racies, legal pluralism is high on the agenda of law and religion scholars because 
State centred legality fails to do justice to the complexity of social and normative 
interactions. Legal pluralism provides the intellectual tools for understanding how 
cultural and religious identities and norms are shaped in different sectors of society. 
Nonetheless, legal pluralism provides no direct and clear answer to the question of 
how social order and equality can be upheld under democratic constitutions. 
Pluralism alone does not guarantee that coexistence among people who live their 
lives in different groups can be sustained by prosocial attitudes, rather than under-
mined by confl ict. Social psychology, cultural anthropology, and political science 
investigate how those attitudes can be nurtured. This chapter argues that to under-
stand and manage the tensions generated by the intersection of state norms and 
religious norms, the law should also make use of the insights provided by these 
disciplines on human behaviour in society. 
 1. - In contemporary liberal democracies, the relations between State law and reli-
gions, both as belief systems and as sets of norms and institutions governing the 
lives of followers, are characterised by certain tensions that are increasingly visible 
and that demand fresh approaches to new issues (Foblets et al.  2014 ; Ferrari  2015 ). 
These tensions revolve around the constitutional principle of equality and involve 
an emerging body of antidiscrimination law applicable to a wide range of conducts 
and institutional practices. The recognition of full personal autonomy underpinning 
life in modern liberal democracies may collide with religious norms concerning 
issues such as abortion, end-of life decisions, marriage and the termination thereof, 
etc.... Modern liberal democracies do not have a stake in the religious beliefs of their 
 M.  Graziadei (*) 
 Università degli Studi di Torino ,  Turin ,  Italy 
 e-mail: michele.graziadei@unito.it 
30
citizens and residents, or have moderate claims about them, recognising in principle 
the value of pluralism in society, despite laws often bearing the traces of a different 
past. All modern liberal democracies protect religious freedom, which in the con-
temporary epoch includes freedom from religion. Freedom of religion is indeed an 
essential part of the constellation of freedoms that modern democracies generally 
intend to guarantee and uphold. That said, this concept is not always understood in 
the same way or recognised to the same extent everywhere (Durham et al.  2013 ). 
 The essays collected in this volume provide abundant food for thought on these 
matters by describing and comparing the normative settings governing the relation-
ships between State norms and religious norms. The purpose of this chapter is to 
explore some of the questions that are left unanswered or are only marginally cov-
ered by other contributions in this volume. Among them, the principal one is whether 
and how the bond of citizenship can be reconciled with the bonds deriving from 
adherence to a religion, and in particular whether religion is to be considered differ-
ent from other cultural phenomena in this respect. This is, in a certain sense, a 
problem that has always existed, since the constitution of the modern States. The 
advent of democracy, with its promise of the provision of equal legal protection for 
all, independent of personal and religious beliefs and more broadly culturally deter-
mined value orientations, has added an entirely new dimension to this issue, as is 
demonstrated by a wealth of recent research (see, e.g., Shah et al.  2014 ; Ferrari and 
Pastorelli  2013 ; Alidadi et al.  2012 ). 
 2. - To put these issues in perspective, it is necessary to return to the inception of 
the modern States, and to the reshaping of the relations between political authori-
ties, law, and religions that lies at the origins of modern religious freedom. The 
making of modern States in the sixteenth century took place amidst bloody wars, 
vicious fi ghts and controversies that tore the Christian world apart. Here I will con-
centrate on the French situation, taking as a reference point the ideas of a pre- 
liberal, non-democratic thinker, Jean Bodin (1530–1596), whose great political and 
philosophical work on sovereignty –  Les Six livres de la République – published in 
1576, marked a turn in the philosophical and political views of the epoch. 
 Bodin’s world was populated by people who did not understand why civic and 
religious obligations should be treated as pertaining to different life ambits. This 
world was marked by intense confl icts that involved religious dimensions, culmi-
nating in the massacre of St. Bartholomew’s Day (1572), when mass killings of 
French Calvinists (Hugonots) instigated by the Catholic King of France took place. 
In those hard times, how to contain violence that resulted or was associated with the 
plurality of polarized religious beliefs was a question of capital importance. Bodin 
considered peace as a precondition for the prosperity of a nation, and ultimately 
preferred peace to religious uniformity across the kingdom. Peace was diffi cult to 
achieve as “the people everywhere are most jealous of their religion” and “cannot 
endure any rites and ceremonies differing from the religions by themselves gener-
ally received” (Bodin  1962 : III, 7; 381). Many of his contemporaries considered 
civil wars necessary if the alternative was sharing the country with heretics. 
Confronted with the deep sectarian divisions of his time, Bodin prudently distanced 
himself from the opinion that religious uniformity formed the foundation of civil 
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coexistence, and suggested that the King should not try to use force against  religious 
minorities, whenever those minorities were established and rooted on the territory. 
He also did not accept the  cuius regio, eius religio principle for France, which was 
favoured by sectors of the nobility and would have torn the country apart. He 
rejected the segmentation of France into semiautonomous units, each with its own 
religion. Civic life in polities traversed by divisions such as those experimented by 
sixteenth century France required a new solution: each person should have the pos-
sibility to practice his or her religion in private. Hence, Kings and rulers should 
abandon attempts to use violence to impose the true religion, to save souls, or to 
punish heretics, but rather consider the example of the Romans, who insisted on the 
public worship of the Roman gods “…yet for all that did they easily suffer every 
man privately within the city to use his own manner and fashion, and his religion” 
(Bodin  1962 , IV, 7, 538). 
 The opinions expressed in  Les Six livres de la République raised the opposition 
of the  dévots who condemned Bodin’s work as a mischievous defence of religious 
pluralism. To reject their arguments, Bodin accepted that religion remains a source 
of legitimacy for temporal powers. Having conceded this, he also maintained that 
even a false religion can help preserve peace in a kingdom. According to Bodin, 
repression is not an effective strategy in such matters, as it is self-defeating. Violence 
will generate further violence: “minds resolved, the more they are crossed, the 
stiffer they are” (Bodin  1962 , III, 7, 382). This line of argument is linked to a wider 
theme, namely the possibility of strengthening the authority of the State by limiting 
its jurisdiction, and establishing constraints on its actions. This theme refl ects a 
religious motive, mirroring as it does in the political sense the possibility - accepted 
by theologians - that God may decide to set limits on his infi nite powers in this 
regard (Holmes  1995 ). One of the implications of this rational was that Christian 
kings must keep their promises to the infi dels as well, an assumption that was cru-
cial in the formation of modern liberal democracies, as well as for laying down the 
foundations of an international mercantile society in the medieval and modern 
period. This stance on the relations between political authority and religions was 
accompanied by a theory of legislation that was associated with positivism. Bodin 
held that  voluntas, not veritas, facit legem. This doctrine worked in a society divided 
into factions, where endless disputes and fi ghts concerned precisely what “reason” 
or “religion” required. However, Bodin was careful not to overplay what legislation 
based solely on sovereignty can achieve, by noting that habits and customs fi xed 
boundaries on sovereign commands and sovereign authority (Holmes  1995 ). 
 At its inception, this inchoate form of religious freedom was justifi ed by an 
eclectic set of considerations concerning religious behaviour. Bodin held that con-
science, by natural necessity, cannot be constrained; he maintained that persecution 
begets hypocrisy, and that tributes coming from pure hearts please God, no matter 
the religious beliefs implicated in the offering. Ultimately, however, all these con-
siderations are inscribed in the theoretical framework of political philosophy, 
according to which rational thinking and political prudence is the key to stable polit-
ical authority. 
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 3. - Legal positivism is thus established as a fi rst response to the problem of how 
to impose authority in a divided society, and yet realism concludes that civil laws 
can govern society only insofar as coercion is not used every time they must be 
applied. This point is not as banal as it appears at fi rst sight. Although religions often 
provide support to ruling powers, religious beliefs may also hinder the smooth 
application of civil laws and thus undermine governments. 
 Legislators and the machinery of the law may fail to persuade on many grounds, 
but opposition to political power and to the law based on religious grounds is noto-
riously diffi cult to overcome or to override, for a variety of reasons, including the 
possibility that many religions have to call upon beliefs relating to an after world, 
or to a supernatural world, to take position on every aspect of social life. This move 
tends to undermine the core tenet of political realism as a method of achieving sta-
ble government, namely the possibility to calculate the consequences of individual 
actions by relying on assumptions that prioritise worldly considerations in the 
weighing of the pros and cons of each possible choice, or course of action.. 1 Major 
theorists of modern sovereignty, such as Thomas Hobbes, were acutely aware of 
this aspect of religious dissent and of the dangers associated with it for the political 
order and the authority of the State. But to be true to Hobbes, his arguments did not 
apply to religious dissent only. Hobbes pointed to other factors - secular factors - as 
the source of trouble for the stability of governments, such as the rhetoric based on 
the readings of classics prevailing in his time at the Universities. 2 Hobbes’ work 
thus stands out in this respect as a manifesto against motivational reductionism, 
which would instead pick the instinct of self-preservation of a person’s life as the 
granitic foundation of political power (Lloyd  1992 ; Holmes  1995 ). According to 
Hobbes, the basic decisions that reasonable individuals should be able to make 
regarding the choice between, subjection to sovereign powers or incurring the con-
sequences of disobedience, including death, does not necessarily lead to choosing 
the fi rst over the second. Surprisingly, contrary to the instinct of self preservation, 
one may choose death over the violation of religious precepts or the betrayal of a 
certain ideology, simply because personal choices are shaped by opinions and 
beliefs, and the prospect of death may in some cases be more attractive than life 
without dignity or damnation, especially if death promises salvation. Ultimately, as 
Hobbes makes clear, even political power is dependent on opinion, because the 
powers of the mighty have no foundations except in the beliefs and the opinion of 
the people (Hobbes  1990 , 16). Therefore, even when not backed by the sword, as 
Hobbes duly noted, “words” and “breath” have an enormous political impact 
1  This is possibly why Max Weber advanced the distinction between value rationality and instru-
mental rationality, the former being much more mysterious than the latter. Whether that distinction 
is defensible in terms of coherence is altogether a different matter, of course (on that distinction, in 
a critical vein, see: Oakes  2003 ). In any case, the work of Habermas on the relationship between 
religious beliefs and civic participation in political debates clearly draws upon it (Habermas  2008 ). 
Once more, one can ask whether his work resists criticism. 
2 Although it may be anachronistic to represent Hobbes’ position in this way, he was anticipating 
the argument made in full by Cavanaugh, according to whom the distinction between religious and 
secular violence is problematic to say the least (Cavanaugh  2009 ). 
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(Hobbes  1986 , II, Ch. 18, 231). The lesson is that force alone fails to persuade. 
Political realism suggests that legal positivism is an empty box if public opinion is 
dominated by passions that may completely destroy respect for the common good 
and authority, be they religious or secular. 
 4. - The arguments discussed above concerning the troubles that legal positivism 
has when confronted with rules of conduct grounded on religious beliefs raise a few 
uncomfortable questions. I will try to sum them up as follows. Are these rules in any 
sense different from other normative or cultural manifestations entering the public 
sphere and governing social interactions? Does the public regulation of conduct 
conforming to religious beliefs pose any special challenge when compared with the 
public regulation of other conducts that confront State authority? 
 Such questions cannot be answered completely here, because just as not all reli-
gions are the same, not all States are same, as is made abundantly clear by the con-
tributions collected in this book and other studies (Foblets et al.  2010 ). Some 
religions regulate the beliefs and conduct that believers must adhere to with greater 
severity. On the other hand, contemporary States have been formed under different 
historical conditions and thus the governments of these States must take into account 
disparate dynamics and forces in deciding what policies to implement. Even 
Europe’s liberal democracies do not all share the same stance towards conduct that 
is inspired by religious precepts in the public sphere. Hence, different historical and 
institutional paths of State formation result in different constitutional settings and 
governmental policies concerning religious matters. Furthermore, history shows 
that both civic and religious obligations may change over time, even within a single 
State, with respect to the same religion. To generalise about the relations between 
State norms and religious norms is impossible without considering the temporal 
dimensions of comparisons and how these concepts are construed across time and 
in different places (in a critical vein: Cavanaugh  2009 ). 
 Nonetheless, the fundamental questions posed above remains interesting, despite 
the variety of models refl ecting the relations between State norms and religious 
norms. To answer them requires understanding religions and how they work in soci-
ety. Quite apart from what religions hold, sociologists, anthropologists, philoso-
phers, economists and natural scientists, have often highlighted the many positive 
effects that religious beliefs and rituals bring to believers and more generally, to 
society. These positive effects include, among other things, improved social cohe-
sion, increased sense of control over one’s life, and so on. On the other hand, reli-
gions have often been examined in a critical vein, as a pernicious form of superstition, 
or false consciousness. 
 I need not to review this evidence, but rather to consider the wider picture con-
cerning the working of religions in society. This includes religious strife with strong 
destabilising effects on society. This possibility is disturbing because compromise 
over religious matters - as mentioned above - is often diffi cult to reach, and religious 
disputes are thus often left without resolve even in the long run. But why should 
religions in particular be a source of concern in this respect? 
 As it often happens, discussing the question from a broader perspective, such as 
that offered by scholarship relating to confl ict studies, will better illuminate this 
point. 
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 Research in this area points to two key factors that work as powerful leverage for 
confl icts; scarcity and unequal distribution of resources. Scarcity of resources, or 
the fear thereof, triggers rivalries and confl icts. Whenever a community or a popula-
tion, hears that “there is not enough left to satisfy everybody” the possibility of 
confl ict rises. Spreading this message in the canonical form – “the more there is of 
mine, the less there is of yours” 3 – makes confl ict both very likely and very harsh. 
On the other hand, although resources may abound, such as during periods of rapid 
economic growth, an unequal or unjust distribution of the surplus can still stir social 
confl icts, especially if attributed to policies enacted by governments, pressures by 
mighty social actors and so on, rather than being considered as God given, or the 
fruit of “chance” or “fate”. 
 Are religions implicated in similar dynamics? Are religions able to produce scar-
city (or the impression of scarcity) of some resources, and how they do so? Do they 
sanction controversial distribution of resources that are not scarce, and if so, how? 
 To this regard, I am largely unconcerned with the distribution of material 
resources dispensed through religious institutions, although distribution of material 
benefi ts has been a function of some religious institutions. I am focussing instead on 
religion as a way of gaining access to immaterial resources that are perceived as 
vital, or at least as very attractive, by a certain community. Whether such resources 
can make life better in this world by fostering the well-being of believers, or guar-
antee salvation in the after world, is not really the issue. Rather, it is how religions 
regulate access to those immaterial resources that can only be gained through adher-
ence to religious beliefs and practices. 
 To delve further into this point, one has to take a second, less conventional look 
at what religions do in the socio-cultural sphere. Religions defi ned as belief systems 
concerned with transcendent dimensions of life apparently have little to do with 
distributional problems. Nonetheless, on closer scrutiny, one can argue that reli-
gions do regulate access to resources that many people consider essential or pre-
cious, as they are considered or perceived as the sources of spiritual or physical well 
being. An analysis of religions from this standpoint casts light on the nature of the 
confl icts in which religions or religious affi liations play a role (Avalos  2005 ,  2012 , 
for a broader coverage of the topic: Jerryson et al.  2012 ). 
 Religions offer resources that are often viewed as scarce, and subject to restricted 
or limited access. Inscripturation, namely the notion that God reveals himself only 
through a select corpus of texts and to a select group of people, is of course central 
to this type of discourse. Sacred places or objects that are necessary to believers 
have this quality as well (think, for example, of descriptions of the sacred land). 
Scarcity is also the mechanism at the basis of group privileging, a feature of both 
ethnic and non-ethnic religions. Salvation – be it physical, spiritual, or both – is 
once more not for all, but for believers only, or for selected believers who share 
certain qualities. Purity, which is a concept central to many religious discourses, is 
an instantiation of the same logic, as it sets one condition to be included in a group 
3 Also known as the Duchess’ law, after the dictum of the Duchess in Lewis Carrol’s  Alice’s adven-
tures in Wonderland (1865), ch. IX . 
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with positive features. One can easily multiply similar examples for a variety of 
religions. 
 Some passages in the holy scriptures of religions justify resorting to violence to 
affi rm religious values and norms, but this is not really an essential point in under-
standing how religions can be instrumental in provoking confl icts and strife. Rather, 
what should be noted is the tendency to foster a mentality in which religion is con-
sidered the (only) way to benefi t from resources that are otherwise diffi cult to 
obtain, and that are therefore limited. Empirical evidence for this thesis comes from 
the fi eld of social psychology. Social psychologists have noticed that religions exac-
erbate in-group bias, namely the tendency to favour members of one’s group and to 
exhibit prejudice towards members of other groups (for a review of the literature, 
which for the moment does not cover all religions, and the discussion of the state of 
the art: Galen  2012a ,  b ). 
 Turning to the second argument mentioned above, namely the adverse social 
effects deriving from the unequal or unjust distribution of certain resources, the 
salient point to consider is that the overall growth of available resources for a com-
munity does not necessarily result in a more peaceful social coexistence. Analysing 
the social effects of economic growth in the 1960s, Mancur Olson made an impor-
tant observation regarding this point (Olson  1963 ). Economic change fostering 
growth often brings with it distributional effects that marginalize individuals or 
social groups, or that reduces their weight and salience in society. Members of the 
community may perceive new distributive patterns emerging during a phase of 
growth driven change as unjust, when compared to previously established distribu-
tions of wealth. Therefore, economic growth can go hand in hand with social trou-
bles and turmoil because those who suffer the adverse effect of change will resist it. 
This key observation can also be applied to the religious realm. If society’s  mores 
change and personal autonomy is expanded, as it happens when previously imper-
missible conduct becomes legitimate, those who consider legitimacy as a scarce 
resource may oppose such change, although the range of choices available to indi-
viduals and groups expands. Current religious objections to laws on gay marriage 
refl ect this logic. To affi rm that these laws uphold marriage as a central institution 
in society will not appease those who think that legislation introducing gay marriage 
as a legitimate form of marriage undermines marriage as an institution reserved for 
heterosexual couples, even though this novel legislation concerns civil marriages 
only, not religious marriages. It will not appease traditionalists, because they con-
sider the concept of “marriage” as belonging to them, and they do not intend to 
share it with others. 
 I have hinted above to the fact that religious beliefs defy empirical validation or 
falsifi cation through tests applicable to scientifi c propositions. But the question of 
why religious struggles are so diffi cult to control, and why religious confrontations 
are so enduring and so hard to bring to an end, has perhaps little to do with these 
aspects of religions as belief systems. Many cultural wars share similar 
 characteristics: they are not easily resolved by rational arguments or by those based 
on empirical evidence. Oliver Wendell Holmes, a famous US Supreme Court 
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Justice, once quipped: “you can’t argue a man into liking a glass of beer”. 4 He was 
right, many preferences linked to cultural conditioning cannot be changed by resort-
ing to rational arguments, or to empirically grounded observations (and yet they are 
still part of the normal spectrum of preferences permitted in a community!). Hence, 
to think over the dilemmas raised by State regulation of religious phenomena 
requires knowing more about other types of confl icts and confrontations as well; to 
highlight what can be learnt about these confl icts when they are approached in a 
broader, cultural perspective. To do so, let us turn to one of the central norms of the 
constitutions of liberal democracies – namely the principle of equality. One of the 
biggest challenges faced by legal theorists is the interpretation of this principle and 
its reconciliation with the increasing diversity of viewpoints related to values and 
cultural practices that are emerging in contemporary democracies. My point is that 
equality as a key constitutional principle can only be preserved through the develop-
ment of new awareness of what cultural differences and confl icts involve for the 
making or unmaking of social order. Social psychologists and political scientists, 
among other social scientists, have explored these dimensions of social life in depth. 
Their fi nding may help to harness and subdue tendencies that would instead work to 
escalate cultural confl icts - including religious confl icts - out of control. 
 5. - The universal recognition of the principle of equality by liberal democracies 
stands in opposition to ancient regimes that were rooted in the division of societies 
into estates. Such divisions were sanctioned by social custom and inscribed into 
law. To overcome them, a State centred notion of legality was designed and joined 
with the foundation of democratic governments under modern constitutions. 5 In 
Europe, a uniform national concept of citizenship was the ultimate outcome of this 
revolutionary project in all States. However, this notion is not universal (see, e.g. 
Segzin  2013 ; Parolin  2009 ,  2014 ). 
 This new political bond was forged to overcome the peculiar and different legal 
conditions of subjects and communities that existed in the territory. Corresponding 
civil institutions were created  ex novo to expand the powers of the States to ambits 
of social life that were previously regulated by religious institutions, such as civil 
marriage, state schools, public hospitals, cemeteries and so on. 
 The idea of equality underpinning this new civic status was intended to be inclu-
sive, and the State thus became the key reference point for the life of the entire 
national community. This process involved the construction of an abstract, egalitar-
ian notion of subjectivity, one that freed people from the bonds held in place by 
previously existing customary regimes, as well from religiously imposed status. As 
4  Full citation: “Deep-seated preferences can not be argued about - you can not argue a man into 
liking a glass of beer - and therefore, when differences are suffi ciently far reaching, we try to kill 
the other man rather than let him have his way. But that is perfectly consistent with admitting that, 
so far as appears, his grounds are just as good as ours.” (Holmes  1918 ). 
5 As far as Europe is concerned, a new concept of citizenship is emerging at the European level, the 
implications of which are still to be fully worked out. 
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it often happens with major change, this too turned out to be a mixed blessing 
(Macdonald  2005 ). 6 
 Detaching law from everyday life to justify the equal treatment of subjects whose 
life trajectories would otherwise be governed by the accidents of birth or belonging, 
also meant separating people from their traditional sites and modes of symbolic 
interaction. As a consequence, this new form of legality - sanctioned by the State - 
was rather distant from the life experience of communities and individuals. State 
centred legality denied that the overlapping communities, in which people live their 
lives as children, parents, spouses, neighbours, workers, etc., are sites rich with 
normativity, in which personal identities are discovered, negotiated, ordered and 
reordered. This can only be perceived by individuals as paradoxical given the cen-
trality of the experience gained in those communities for the realisation of personal 
autonomy (Macdonald  2005 ). Religious fundamentalism can be understood as an 
extreme reaction to this state of affairs, purporting, as it does, to impose an idealised 
model of society that should be governed as if civic bonds did not exist. It is not by 
chance that some scholars argue that fundamentalism originates in urban, rather 
than in rural ambiences, because it explodes as a consequence of contact with 
modernity (Ozzano  2014 ). 
 Much time has gone by since the realisation of the constitutional project that led 
modern democracies to adopt and extol that notion of civil subjectivity. The assimi-
lationist model that backed up the original idea of a national citizenship has soft-
ened over the past few decades. It has been rendered more inclusive by mellowing 
the reference to dominant social values that it implicitly endorsed - a case in point 
is the evolution of blasphemy laws in modern democracies - and by opening it up to 
diversity. Recognition granted to minority groups and subordinated identities now 
takes a variety of forms, from the purely symbolic - such as an apology for past 
crimes or wrongs, gay pride parades, etc. etc.- to more inclusive policies formulated 
in terms of reasonable accommodation for practices required by religious beliefs 
(Bribosia et al.  2013 ; Alidadi et al.  2012 ). But the State centred model of legality 
that is connected to the rise of the nation state has hardly been challenged as far as 
its core mechanism is concerned. State centred legality still tends to deny the over-
lapping communities in which people live their lives and in which personal identi-
ties take shape, the nature of competing normative communities. For the State those 
social sites cannot generate competing legal regimes, therefore the order which pro-
vides structure to these social spheres is represented by the State in terms of “brute” 
or “mute” facts (Macdonald  2005 ). The State may establish coordination mecha-
nisms with those alternative sources of normativity, but this is not to be taken for 
granted, and for good reason. The strategy of fostering a notion of citizenship based 
on a very selective approach to the construction of citizens’ national identities was 
considered to be the most inclusive strategy that public institutions could follow at 
the time. Reluctance to change this model is not too surprising, and should not be 
6  In the history of political thought, Tocqueville’s analysis of democracy points to the same conclu-
sion highlighted above: Jaume ( 2014 ). 
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confounded with recent moves such as the enactment of anti-sharia laws, which are 
the expression of an entirely different political inspiration. 
 In our epoch this classic model is challenged by the open recognition that a 
monist notion of legality is not really all we have, even in countries that have tradi-
tionally adhered to it. 
 The dynamics of the law both within State borders and beyond them at the inter-
national level, highlight the unmaking of the strong notion of sovereignty, cast light 
on a renewed interest in legal pluralism at all levels of analysis (see the contribution 
of Turner 2016, Chap.  4 in this volume; on pluralism on a global scale: Berman 
 2012 ; Michaels  2009 ). In this context, State courts may silently acknowledge the 
need to coordinate their jurisdiction with that of alternative adjudicatory bodies: if 
justice is best served by a collaborative approach, implicit recognition of the exis-
tence of alternative fora may be the rule of the game. On the other hand, the decline 
of sovereignty, and the rise of legal pluralism as a form of legality in highly complex 
democratic societies and at the international level, has not ended the debate over 
what legal pluralism brings in modern contemporary democracies. 
 The essays in this collection cast light on this changing landscape, as far as reli-
gious norms are concerned, and I do not need to say more on the point. I would 
rather insist on a point that is all too often neglected in these debates, namely that 
State legality itself, although often presented as monolithic, is actually rather porous 
and malleable, being the result of a complex set of social forces, checks and bal-
ances, discretions, habits, and values often pointing in different directions. Every 
lawyer will quickly admit this when considering the wavering of legislatures over 
controversial and divisive issues, the manifestation of bureaucratic discretions, or 
judicial dissent linked to different judicial ideologies in diffi cult and not so diffi cult 
cases. State law is in itself a mishmash of very different things. 7 
 Captured through the lenses of legal pluralism, State law is not stable, it is con-
stantly made and unmade, it is not self-contained and it is subject to centre- periphery 
tensions. What is true in Texas may not be true in Massachusetts, and what holds in 
Jerusalem may be rejected in Tel Aviv. The credibility of State law owes much to the 
fact that of all the organisations on a certain territory, the State is usually - but not 
always - the actor with the most resources at its disposal. Nonetheless, when called 
to operate in confl ict-ridden contexts, State offi cials know that State law, from 
which their authority stems, has no monopoly of normativity. Rather, as it has been 
aptly said, it is “…nothing more, and nothing less, than a hypothesis about social 
life.” (Macdonald  2005 ; Nichols  2015 ). 
 6. - Once these points are clarifi ed, the question of how equality should be rec-
onciled with the plurality of identities and competing normativities that exist in 
society beyond the realm of State law remains open. Legal pluralism as a theory, or 
as a set of theories, does not necessarily address how diversity can be turned into a 
resource for individuals and for society as a whole, rather than becoming a cause of 
fragmentation and anomie. That said it would be an exaggeration to claim that this 
7  The point is well put by Ramsted’s contribution Chap.  3 in this volume: “Western law does not 
constitute universal law,  not even in Western societies .” (emphasis added). 
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is unchartered territory. By now we know that the State’s pretence to rank personal 
identities, to model them, and to decide in favour of one identity over another, is 
nothing but a bet on the lasting validity of dominant values and social orientations. 
In the worst-case scenario, it is a recipe for tragedy, which will materialise when 
dominant values and social orientations are imposed on people thorough violence. 
We also know that no catalogue of rights can hope to capture the constant evolution 
and destruction of identity claims through which agency is asserted in society. A 
table of values and prescriptions set in stone will not stop change, evolution, and 
differentiation in society. Personal autonomy and free consent as the rules of the 
game may be resisted in the name of a secular ideology, or religious beliefs, and 
they do not necessarily favour social cohesion. 
 How to address the riddles that are posed by the paradoxical juxtaposition of 
equality and diversity? 
 One possibility is to reconsider the role of the State by highlighting that the 
equality discourse was initiated to cater for increased diversity and inclusion, rather 
than to enforce exclusion and uniformity. By embracing that principle, the State 
abandoned policies leading to religious persecutions, forced deportation, oppres-
sion of minorities and so on. Equality therefore does not need to be the enemy of 
diversity. Equality was once the surrogate catchword for more diversity and less 
exclusion, and to an extent it still is (see Foblets et al.  2014 ). If new identities intro-
duce more diversity in the public space, this dynamic should not automatically be 
labelled as an attempt to undermine equality, or the possibility of civic coexistence. 
Social life becomes troublesome only when one social group is perceived by the 
others as an obstacle to achieving their own goals. In that case, each group will dis-
like the other, devalue them and reject the idea of collaborating with them, assuming 
to have nothing in common with them (Kessler and Mummendey  2008 ). 
 Under a naive form of social theory, one would think that individual attitudes 
determine social interactions among groups. Social psychology shows instead that 
attitudes towards “the others” are determined by the conditions of group interdepen-
dence and interaction, which may be negative or positive (Sherif  1966 ). Even groups 
that initially share homogeneous features may end up displaying prejudice and hos-
tility as they interact in a competitive setting (for a review of the literature: Hewstone 
et al.  2008 : 293 ff.). Perhaps, the most startling discovery made by social psycholo-
gists was that classifying individuals into arbitrary distinct social categories was 
suffi cient enough to produce in-group–out-group discrimination and bias although 
they did not share a history of competition or confl ict between them (Tajfel et al. 
 1971 ; see also Rabbie and Horwitz  1969 ). Changing the conditions of interdepen-
dence and turning negative interdependence into positive interdependency is a way 
of unlocking prosocial, collaborative behaviour if all groups in society are accorded 
equal status and are not set in competition one against the others (Allport  1954 ; 
Pettigrew and Tropp  2006 ). One way of establishing positive interdependency is by 
creating superordinate goals that may unite groups that have otherwise an incentive 
to compete one against the other (Deschamps and Brown  1983 ). 
2 State Norms, Religious Norms, and Claims of Plural Normativity…
40
 One can hope to forge new loyalties to overcome the tendency of social groups 
to discriminate out-groups also by exploring the notion that social life today takes 
place in a variety of arenas, facilitating contacts and intersections of various groups 
that shape the self and self perception in different ways, which would make the most 
of their positive distinctiveness and mutual superiority across various dimensions 
(Hewston and Brown  1986 ; Brown and Hewstone  2005 ). Another fi nding by social 
psychologists illuminates the dynamics of group confl ict, namely so-called discon-
tinuity effect. In the presence of a confl ict over scarce resources, the competitive-
ness displayed when individuals interact with other individuals is less intense than 
the competiveness displayed among groups. This is because the willingness to col-
laborate at the individual level may be overshadowed by the competitive orientation 
of a group driven by factors that psychologist are still exploring (Wildschut and 
Insko  2007 ). 
 On the other hand, the dynamics of identity building across social boundaries 
make it clear that cultural variation happens along a continuous rather than discon-
tinuous line, and that the ecology of the ambience in which an individual or a group 
operates shapes it, as anthropology and political science show (Barth  1998 ; Ozzano 
 2009 ). Evidence from the legal fi eld, relating in particular to patterns of litigation 
over wealth distribution upon the dissolution of marriage confi rms this observation 
(Fournier  2010 ). 
 Research in the fi eld of social psychology and anthropology thus introduces new 
ways to understand the dynamics of social confl icts. The theories developed in those 
fi elds speak more generally about the limits of the law in addressing problems con-
cerning the coexistence of religious and State norms. 
 One last refl ection concerns the role of political parties and/or movements claim-
ing a religious identity in the making of laws. The literature on law and religion 
seldom covers this aspect, but political scientists pay attention to it (Ozzano and 
Cavatorta  2014 ). The main question is whether the inclusion of radical religious 
parties in political games contributes to moderation of their discourses and their 
initiatives, or not. The arguments favouring inclusion of these parties in the repre-
sentative system, so that they may shift towards moderate positions that are compat-
ible with democratic regimes, rely on a number of factors. The extremist party that 
participates in the political game is bound to accept political diversity in the fi rst 
place, and to dilute its ideology to attract outside voters. If a radical party is power- 
driven, it is also likely to rely on alliances with parties that do not share its extrem-
ism whenever absolute majority is not in sight. Lastly, while extremist parties may 
develop ideas from ideological social movements obsessed with doctrinal purity, 
the step from niche to mass party usually brings about emancipation from them. The 
empirical testing of this hypothesis returns a mixed picture, however. Although 
there are examples confi rming the hypothesis, research shows that inclusion of radi-
cal political parties in parliamentary regimes does not always result in a stable mod-
erate approach (Jaffrelot  2014 ), while their exclusion from the political game can 




 Contemporary democracies are open to cultural diversity, but have problems when 
prevailing values and norms are questioned in the name of religious or cultural 
beliefs and practices. In many Western liberal democracies, legal pluralism is high 
on the agenda of law and religion scholars because State centred legality fails to do 
justice to the complexity of social interactions. Legal pluralism provides the intel-
lectual tools to understand how cultural identities, including religious identities, are 
shaped in different sites in society. 
 Nonetheless, legal pluralism provides no direct and clear answer to the question 
of how social order respecting equality can be upheld under democratic constitu-
tions. Pluralism as such does not guarantee that coexistence among people who 
form different groups shall be sustained by prosocial attitudes, rather than under-
mined by confl ict. Social psychology, cultural anthropology and political science 
investigate how those attitudes can be fostered. 
 This chapter argues that to understand and govern the tensions generated by the 
intersection of state norms and religious norms, the law should benefi t from the 
insights about human behaviour in society that these disciplines provide as well. 
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